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The concept of ‘economic activity’ in the EU Treaty:  
From ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts 
 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos
* 
 
I. Introduction 
The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,
1 only 
apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive 
to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,
2 
and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of non-
discrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic 
activity.
3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ 
(having positive or negative market value),
4  workers (even if admitted in an extensive 
manner),
5 and services (offered for remuneration).
6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity 
of offering goods and services into the market’
7  that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus 
making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that 
Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide 
harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the 
distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic 
services  of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General 
                                                            
* The final version of this article will be published in the European Business Law Review, 2012 
(forthcoming). 
1 Amongst the most prominent supporters of the idea that the EU Treaties may be seen as an 
economic constitution, see Joerges, C., ‘A Renaissance of the European Economic Constitution?’ 
in Neergard, U., Nielsen, R., and Roseberry, L. (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law 
(Copenhaguen: DJØF Publishing, 2009) 29-52; see also, on a more pessimistic tone, Joerges, C., 
‘What is left of the European economic constitution?: A melancholic eulogy’ (2005) 30 EL Rev 461-
89, also available at http://www.iue.it/PUB/law04-13.pdf (last accessed on 28/11/2011); Baquero-
Cruz, J., Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic Constitutional Law of the 
European Community (Oxford/ Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
2 Odudu, O., ‘Economic Activity as a Limit to Community Law’ in Barnard, C., and Odudu, O. (eds), 
The Outer Limits of EU Law (Oxford/ Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 225-43. 
3  See also the Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2006) 516, ‘Annex to the 
Communication on Social Services of General Interest in the EU (COM (2006) 177 final)’, s. 1.1.1; 
more recently see Report COM (2010) 630/4, ‘EU Citizenship Report 2010: Dismantling the 
obstacles to EU citizens’ rights’. 
4 For an example of goods having negative market value see e.g. Case C-2/90 Commission v 
Belgium (Walloon Waste) [1992] ECR I-4431. 
5 Such as e.g. in Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745; of course the recent surge of 
citizenship case law somehow alleviates this ‘economic’ vision of the free movement of persons; 
on this case law see, among many Besson, S. and Utzinger, A., ‘Introduction: Future Challenges 
of European Citizenship: Facing a Wide-Open Pandora’s Box’ (2007) 13 ELJ 573-90; and Epinay, 
A., ‘The Scope of Article 12 EC: Some Remarks on the Influence of European Citizenship’ (2007) 
13 ELJ 611-22. 
6 Even if remuneration is admitted in an extensive manner as e.g. in Joined cases C-51/96 and C-
191/97 Christelle Deliège v. Ligue Francophone de Judo e.a. [2000] ECR I-2549; Case C-157/99 
B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep 
Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; and Case C-281/06 Jundt [2007] ECR I-12231. 
7 Case C-205/03 P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I-6295, para 25.   3 
Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and 
non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states.  
The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and 
technical intricacies –  the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and 
regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with 
political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological 
confusions.
8  
Economic theory offers helpful classifications, but is much less clear about the actual content 
of each one of the proposed categories. A basic distinction drawn is between private and 
public goods (although the term ‘goods’ typically refers to services, in the economic sense of 
the term). Public goods are distinguished from ordinary (private) goods, because they have 
two special features: a. they are non-rivalrous  in consumption  in the sense that, once 
produced, an infinite number of consumers can enjoy them without increased production cost 
or diminished enjoyment by other consumers; moreover, b. they are non-excludable, in the 
sense that the producer cannot prevent non-purchasers from enjoying the benefits of the 
services produced. Therefore, there is not sufficient interest by private providers to supply 
such services, as they fear they would not be able to reap the full benefit of their 
investments.
9 Hence, the state steps in and offers such services, usually financed through 
general taxation. Typical examples of public services could be the police, national security, 
road safety, emergency services, refuse collection and management.  
A further category has been devised, standing between public and private goods and is 
termed ‘merit goods’.
10 These are services which are so meritorious that the state holds that, 
if they were left to market forces alone, the level of their consumption would be too low, 
because their price would be too high; hence, it intervenes in order to obtain a higher level of 
consumption. This is achieved through heavily subsidizing or offering such services free of 
charge, financed by tax revenue or compulsory contributions. Typical examples of such 
services are health and education.
11  The above economic classifications, however, have 
barely made it into any legal instrument.  
In view of the abovementioned difficulties in delineating economic from non-economic 
activities and of the core importance that, nonetheless, such distinction has for the application 
of EU law, the present study’s ambition is to raise two basic questions: ‘are activities 
economic or non-economic depending on the set of EU rules applicable’ and ‘what are the 
                                                            
8 In the context of the EU, see already Mortelmans, K., ‘The Common Market, the Internal Market 
and the Single Market: What’s in a market?’ (1998) 35 CML Rev 101-36. 
9 See eg Stiglitz, J., Economics of the Public Sector (London: WW Norton, 2000) 128-9; and more 
recently, Kaul, I., Grunberg, I., and Stern, M.A., ‘Defining Global Public Goods’ in Kaul, I., 
Grunberg, I., and Stern, M.A. (eds), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21
st 
Century (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 2-19. 
10 Musgrave, R.A., ‘A Multiple Theory of Budget Determination’ 1997 (17) FinanzArchiv 331-43, 
also available at http://autoren.mohr.de/fa/musgrave_budget_ determination.pdf (last accessed on 
28/11/2011). 
11 For a recent and interesting discussion of this classification under the realm of the state aid 
rules, see Fiedziuk, N., ‘Towards a More Refined Economic Approach to Services of General 
Economic Interest’ (2010) 16 Eur P L 271-88.   4 
criteria used for defining the scope of application of EU law to activities of an ambiguous 
nature?’. 
 
II. Single or multiple definitions of ‘economic’ 
A. In favour of a single approach 
Several arguments may be put forward in favour of a unitary approach of the concept of 
economic activity.  
Pure logic requires that any term should have the same meaning irrespective of the context in 
which it is being used; indeed, this is the very advantage of alphabetical writing over older – 
contextual  –  writings, where the meaning of the worlds used had to be inferred from the 
context.
12 To put it more bluntly, an apple is an apple, irrespective of whether we look at it 
wearing blue, green or red lenses. 
The Treaty logic also clearly militates in favour of a single definition of the term ‘economic 
activity’. Indeed, if the Treaty rules have a common finality and if some coherence exists 
between the various Treaty provisions, then it would defeat the purpose to use the same 
terms as having different meanings in the various contexts. Such divergent interpretations 
would also run counter to the principle of coherence enshrined in Article 7 TFEU. 
There is a further, textual, argument against a differential interpretation of the term ‘economic 
activity’ under the internal market and the competition rules, respectively. If internal market 
and competition rules could be thought to stand on parity and independently from each other, 
the Lisbon Treaty has clearly subdued the latter to the former: undistorted competition has 
disappeared, as such, from the aims of the EU (Articles 3(3) TEU and 3(1)b TFEU) and has 
been relegated to Protocol 27, according which ‘the internal … market includes a system 
ensuring that competition is not distorted’.
13 Therefore, competition law is, henceforth, part of 
a broader concept of ‘internal market’ and may not possibly command a different 
interpretation of the same terms.  
The Court, already in the foundational competition law cases, such as Consten v Grundig,
14 
has expressly acknowledged that the ultimate aim of the competition rules is to make sure 
that private undertakings are not allowed to ‘frustrate the most fundamental objections (sic) of 
the Community’. Similarly, in the first German ambulance case, Glöckner, where the 
applicability of the competition rules was at stake, the Court held that ‘in the case of services, 
that effect [on trade justifying the applicability of Article 101 TFEU], may consist, as the Court 
has held, in the activities in question being conducted in such a way that their effect is to 
partition the common market and thereby restrict freedom to provide services, which 
                                                            
12  Havelock, E., ‘The Alphabetical Mind: A Gift of Greece to the Modern Word’ (1986) 1 Oral 
Tradition  134-150, also available at http://journal.oraltradition.org/files/articles/1i/6_havelock.pdf 
(last accessed on 28/11/2011); and more extensively, by the same author, The Literate Revolution 
in Greece and its Cultural Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
13 Emphasis added. 
14 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission [1966] ECR 429, English Special Edition 299.   5 
constitutes one of the objectives of the Treaty’.
15 Also at the level of justification, the Court 
draws clear parallels between the internal market and the competition rules. In Freskot,
16 the 
Court based itself on the competition case law according to which activities characterised by 
solidarity are not subject to the competition rules and used it to set aside the internal market 
rules. Last but not least, in Wouters,
17 confirmed by Meca Medina,
18 the Court held that the 
overriding reasons of general interest available to member states in order to justify restrictions 
to the free movement rules, may also serve to justify anti-competitive conduct. 
On the basis of all the above, it must be concluded that the concept of economic activity is 
unitary and has the same content under both internal market and competition law, a view 
shared by numerous authors including the present.
19  
 
B. In favour of a dual approach 
In several recent cases the Court has held the rules on the internal market to be applicable, 
while holding competition rules inapplicable, and vice versa. The first case clearly accounting 
for such a dichotomy has been the Court’s judgment in Meca Medina,
20 on appeal from the 
General Court. In this judgment, which raised the question whether the competition rules 
applied on the International Olympic Committee’s decisions on admissible doping levels, the 
Court quashed the first instance judgment on the ground that (para 31) 
‘even if those [anti-doping] rules do not constitute restrictions on freedom of movement 
because they concern questions of purely sporting interest and, as such, have nothing to 
do with economic activity (Walrave & Koch and Donà), that fact means neither that the 
sporting activity in question necessarily falls outside the scope of Articles 81 EC and 82 
EC [101 & 102 TFEU] nor that the rules do not satisfy the specific requirements of those 
articles’.  
If Meca Medina stands for the idea that the inapplicability of the free movement rules does not 
exclude the applicability of competition rules, Viking  confirms that the same applies vice 
versa. In this judgment the Court held that (para 53)  
‘the fact that an agreement or an activity are excluded from the scope of the provisions of 
the Treaty on competition does not mean that that agreement or activity also falls outside 
the scope of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of persons or services since 
those two sets of provisions are to be applied in different circumstances’.
21 
                                                            
15 Case C-475/99 Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-8089, para 
49. 
16 Case C-355/00 Freskot AE v. Elliniko Dimosio [2003] ECR I-5263. 
17 Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577. 
18 C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission of the European Communities 
[2006] ECR I-6991. 
19  Idot, L., ‘Concurrence et libre circulation: Regards sur les derniers développements’ (2005) 
Revue des Affaires Européennes 391-409, at 370; and more recently, Neergaard, U., ‘Services of 
General (Economic) Interest: What Aims and Values Count?’ in Neergaard, U., Nielsen, R., and 
Roseberry, L. (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 
2009) 191-224. 
20 See above n 18. 
21 This finding has been repeated by the Court in few more occasions, such as in Kattner and in 
Commission v Germany (old age pensions).   6 
This disjunction between the two sets of rules has been outlined and explained by AG Maduro 
in his opinion in FENIN in the following terms:
22  
‘the scope of freedom of competition and that of the freedom to provide services are not 
identical. There is nothing to prevent a transaction involving an exchange being classified 
as the provision of services, even where the parties to the exchange are not undertakings 
for the purposes of competition law. As stated above, the Member States may withdraw 
certain activities from the field of competition if they organise them in such a way that the 
principle of solidarity is predominant, with the result that competition law does not apply. 
By contrast, the way in which an activity is organised at the national level has no bearing 
on the application of the principle of the freedom to provide services’. 
On the basis of the above developments, several commentators have put forward the idea 
that the concept of economic activity differs under the internal market and the competition 
rules, respectively.
23  
The above idea, however, goes well beyond the positions ever expressed by the Court or its 
Advocate Generals. Indeed, in the excerpts above (and in all other occasions in which the 
Court or its AGs have dissociated internal market from competition rules) they reason in terms 
of the scope  of the respective Treaty freedoms, not in terms of a differential concept of 
economic activity itself.  
It is submitted, therefore, that the above idea fails to identify a fundamental distinction, never 
abandoned by the Court, between, on the one hand, the concept of economic activity which is 
one and the same for all the Treaty freedoms and, on the other hand, the scope of application 
of these sets of rules, which differs substantially in many ways.
24 
                                                            
22 AG Maduro, opinion in Case C-205/03P FENIN [2006] ECR I-6295, para 51, fn omitted. 
23 See e.g. Odudu, O., ‘Economic Activity as a Limit to Community Law’ in Barnard, C. and Odudu, 
O. (eds), The Outer Limits of EU Law (Oxford/ Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 225-43; see also 
Schweitzer, H., ‘Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an uneasy Relationship: The 
Example of Article 81’ EUI Law Working Paper No. 30/2007, also available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/7623/3/LAW-2007-30.pdf, (last accessed on 
28/11/2011), at 3; see also Case C-205/03P Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología 
Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-6295 (AG). 
24 For which see below section IV.   7 
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The above distinction which, to my eyes, already corresponds to the positivist approach 
followed by the Court, has also its normative merits: its second limb allows the Court 
important leeway to determine the scope of the Treaty rules, while leaving the more political 
first limb to the political process. Indeed, the distinction of the economic from the non-
economic is not a question for the judiciary, but rather corresponds to fundamental political 
and societal choices. Therefore, bodies enjoying democratic legitimacy should be given a 
lead in relation to this question.  
 
III. Exploring the contours of the concept of ‘economic’ 
A. The political debate 
The distinction between the economic and the non-economic is a very delicate task, 
corresponding to basic political and societal choices. It has been answered in different ways 
by different political systems, and, more strikingly, by different countries supposedly following 
the same political system. Therefore, health as a commodity, largely accepted us such in the 
US, would be shocking to most, if not all, Europeans (at least few years ago), while waiting 
lists for patients, largely in use in the UK, would appear intolerable to most Scandinavians. 
The EU, at first glance, lacks both the technical means and the political legitimacy to 
participate in this discussion. 
Increasingly, however, as the EU’s competences expanded beyond the pure economic 
sphere, the EU institutions felt the need to circumscribe the debate, essentially taking place at 
the national level. In this direction, and in order to affirm its autonomy, the EU first ‘unrolled’ 
its own terminology and, less successfully, also tried to specify the content of the various 
terms used.  
Therefore, the term ‘services of general economic interest’ existing in (what is now) Article 
106(2) has been re-invented in the early nineties, later to be opposed to ‘non-economic   8 
services of general interest’. This dichotomy has been turned into a three-prong distinction, 
since ‘social services of general interest’ came to occupy the middle field. In parallel with the 
re-invention of Article 106(2) and of SGEIs, the concept of ‘universal service’ has been 
introduced by several texts of secondary legislation. As if the terminology were not already 
confusing enough, the Court in its seminal judgment in Altmark
25 also revived the term ‘public 
service obligations’, which had fallen into oblivion, then repealed, together with its bearing 
Regulation 1191/69.
26  
The above varied terminology is symptomatic of the lack of clear concepts in the definition of 
economic and non-economic services.  
Each one of the above terms has been used inconsistently, by different users (depending on 
their ideological background) at different times (depending on the accepted perception of the 
scope of the internal market rules). In this last respect it is worth noting that the Commission 
in its successive Communications
27 has consistently repeated its attachment to the autonomy 
of member states to organise their non-economic services, while at the same time, defining 
those in an increasingly restrictive manner. This tendency has been presented in a brilliant 
manner by D. Damjanovic and B. de Witte and need not be reproduced here.
28 As it was to 
                                                            
25  Case C-280/00  Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v. 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
[2003] ECR I-7747; further on this judgment, see in subsection B(5)d below. 
26  Council Regulation 1191/69/EEC on action by Member States concerning the obligations 
inherent in the concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway [1969] OJ 
English Special Edition I, p. 276, as amended by Council Regulation 1893/91/EEC amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 on action by Member States concerning the obligations inherent in 
the concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway [1991] OJ L169/1); 
now repealed by the European Parliament and Council Regulation 1370/2007/EC on public 
passenger transport services by rail and by road [2007] OJ L315/1. 
27  Communication  COM (1996) 443 final, ‘Services of general interest in Europe’ [1996] OJ 
C281/3; Communication from the Commission, ‘Services of General Interest in Europe’ [2001] OJ 
C17/4; COM (2001) 597 final, ‘Report to the Laeken European Council-  Services of General 
Interest’;  Communication COM (2002) 331 final, ‘A Methodological Note for the Horizontal 
Evaluation of Services of General Economic Interest’;  this has been further elaborated by the 
Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2004) 866, ‘Horizontal evaluation of the performance 
of network industries providing services of general economic interest’; COM (2002) 636 final, 
‘Report from the Commission on the state of play in the work on the guidelines for state aid and 
services of general economic interest (SGEIs)’; Green Paper COM (2003) 270 final, ‘on Services 
of General Interest’. See also the Report on the ensuing consultation (SEC (2004) 326); White 
Paper COM (2004) 374 final, ‘Services of general interest’; Community framework for State aid in 
the form of public service compensation [2005] OJ C297/4; Communication COM (2007) 725, 
‘Services of general interest, including social services of general interest: a new European 
commitment’; Communication COM (2011) 146 final, Reform of the EU State Aid Rules on 
Services of General Economic Interest, together with its SEC (2011) 397 document; the 
Commission has dedicated a webpage on this topic where all relevant documents are posted, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/index_en.htm (last accessed on 28/11/2011). 
28  Damjanovic, D., and de Witte, B., ‘Welfare values and welfare integration under the Lisbon 
Treaty’ in Neergaard, U., Roseberry, L., and Nielsen, R. (eds), Integrating welfare functions into 
EU law: From Rome to Lisbon (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009) 53-94; it is true that these 
authors do not reason exclusively on the basis of the Commission’s activity, but i. a big part of their 
analysis does concern this institution, and ii. in its Communications, the Commission is supposed 
to be describing the state of the law as it results from the practice of all the institutions– therefore, 
the article is fully relevant in order to understand and assess the content of the Commission-
originated soft law.   9 
be expected, this lack of clear definitions has nurtured voluminous legal and political science 
commentary.
29 
Today, it is possible to identify several sources of EU law where the distinction between 
SGEIs and NESGIs, or more generally, between economic and non-economic activities is 
being discussed. At the level of primary law, next to the (perennial) Article 106 TFEU, the 
Lisbon Treaty has added three more references to the above distinction. Article 14 TFEU 
concerns exclusively SGEIs, which it recognises as being part of the shared values of the 
Union which should, nonetheless, be ‘without prejudice’ to the Treaty rules on public 
undertakings (106 TFEU) and state aids (93 and 107 TFEU). In the second paragraph of 
Article 14 TFEU, the EU legislature is given a legal basis to regulate SGEI provision, ‘without 
prejudice to the competence of Member States’. The EU’s attachment on high quality SGEIs 
and on access thereto is being confirmed by Article 36 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Protocol 26 recognises, for the first time, SGIs (as opposed to SGEIs) as a legal 
category.  
At the level of secondary legislation, two series of legal instruments dealing with SGEIs may 
be distinguished. First, (even though the term used is ‘universal service’) there are all the 
sector-specific Directives on the re-regulation of the network industries: electronic 
communications, energy, postal services etc. The solutions adopted in each one of them vary 
considerably, at least in three respects. First and foremost, there is the delimitation of 
competences, of whether it is for the member states or the Union to define the precise 
conditions of universal service. Secondly, the question of how universal service is financed: in 
transport, state funding may be used, subject to transparency obligations; in energy, EU 
funding could also be made available; in the field of postal services, it is through the 
maintenance of limited exclusivity that universal service is to be funded; in electronic 
communications, it is through mutual compensation or through the creation of a fund. Thirdly, 
it should be noted that not only the actual definition but also the main characteristics of 
universal service may be altered from one sector to the other. Next to these sector-specific 
texts, the Services Directive is supposed to apply to SGEIs in a horizontal, and yet limited, 
                                                            
29  For the  most important recent official initiatives in the field, see the relevant Commission 
webpage, at http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/index_en.htm  (last accessed on 
28/11/2011). A normative analysis of the topic is offered in the excellent contributions contained in 
the edited volumes by Krajewski, M., Neergard, U., and van de Gronden, J. (eds), The Changing 
Legal Framework for Services of General Interest (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2009); van de 
Gronden, J. (ed), EU and WTO Law on Services: Limits to the Realization of General Interest 
Policies within the Services Markets? (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009); 
Neergaard, U., Nielsen, R., and Roseberry, L. (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law: 
From Rome to Lisbon (Copenhagen: DJØF Publising, 2009); Potvin-Solis, L. (ed), La Libéralisation 
des Services d’Intérêt Economique Général en Réseau en Europe (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2010) ; 
Louis, J.V. and Rodriguez, S. (eds), Les Services d’Intérêt Economique Général et l’UE (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 2006); Bauby, P., Coing, H., and de Toledo, A. (eds), Les Services Publics en Europe: 
Pour une Régulation Démocratique (Paris: Publisud, 2007); see also Cox, H., Fournier J., and 
Girardot, M. (eds), Les Services d’Intérêt Economique Général en Europe: Régulation, 
Financement, Evaluation, Bonnes Pratiques  (Paris: CEEP/ CIRIEC, 2000); and more recently, 
Eckert, G., ‘La distinction entre les services d’intérêt général économique et les services d’intérêt 
général non-économiques’ in Potvin-Solis, L. (ed), La libéralisation des services d’intérêt 
économique général en réseau en Europe (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2010) 3-21.   10 
manner. Last but not least, there is the entire body of the Commission’s soft law, briefly 
discussed above.  
From all the sources mentioned above, three common lines may be drawn. First, there is the 
issue of pre-emption: to the extent that the way to secure SGEI, universal service etc., is 
being foreseen by EU legislation, member states’ free hand to impose restrictions on the 
relevant activities is limited. Second, in the absence of EU legislation, the distinction between 
economic and non-economic activity fundamentally remains an issue for the member states 
to decide, subject, however, to the Court’s control of manifest error.
30  Third, and most 
importantly, it may be observed that contrary to states, which put into place (educational, 
healthcare  etc.)  systems, EU reasoning is made on the basis of specific services  cherry-
picked among other similar (but more marketable) services, from within the systems set by 
the states. It is submitted that this opposition between the member states reasoning in terms 
of systems and the EU reasoning in terms of services is quintessential for understanding the 
tensions accruing between the two legal orders in relation to the provision of SGEIs. 
 
B. The judicial solutions reached 
From the above brief analysis it becomes clear that distinguishing economic from non-
economic activities is a polyphonic exercise, both in terms of the actors involved and in terms 
of the views expressed and of the way the distinction is being put to work in the different 
fields. It is not surprising, therefore, that only rarely does the Court reach a conclusion as to 
the nature of the activity involved.  
According to the Court’s case law there are two basic characteristics which render an activity 
non-economic: the exercise of public authority, involving what may be termed as ‘strategic 
services’; and the expression of social solidarity, involving social services. Examples in the 
first category may be cited in relation to communal funeral services,
31 mooring services in 
ports,
32 air traffic control,
33 anti-pollution surveillance.
34 Private security services, however, 
are not, according to the Court strategic services and are fully subject to the Treaty rules,
35 
the same as the labelling and the control of ecological products.
36 The confines of the second 
category are even less clear, as it is very difficult to know when any given activity embodies 
                                                            
30 Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81, para 166; see also ibid, para 168, where it is stated 
that ‘the control which the Community institutions are authorised to exercise over the use of the 
discretion of the Member State in determining SGEIs is limited to ascertaining whether there is a 
manifest error of assessment’. 
31 Case 30/87 Corinne Bodson v SA Pompes funèbres des régions libérées [1988] ECR 2479. 
32 Case C-49/89 Corsica Ferries France [1989] ECR 4441. 
33 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43; Case C-481/07P 
Selex Sistemi Integrati SpA. v Commission [2009] ECR I-2207. 
34 Case C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli Srl v. Servizi ecologici porto di Genova SpA (SEPG) [1996] 
ECR I-1547. 
35 See e.g. Case C-114/97 Commission v. Spain (private security) [1998] ECR I-6717; Case C-
355/98 Commission v. Belgium (private security) [2000] ECR I-1221; Case C-283/99 Commission 
v.  Italy  (private security)  [2001] ECR I-4363; Case C-171/02  Commission v.  Portugal  (private 
securities) [2004] ECR I-5645; Case C-189/03 Commission v. Netherlands (private security firms) 
[2004] ECR I-5645; Case C-514/03 Commission v Spain (private security) [2006] ECR I-963. 
36 Case C-393/05 Commission v Austria (ecological labelling) [2007] ECR I-10195; Case C-404/05 
Commission v Germany (ecological labelling) [2007] ECR I-10239.   11 
‘enough’ solidarity for it not to qualify as economic.
37 According to the Court, the organisation 
of primary pension schemes is outside the market,
38 the same as statutory insurance against 
work accidents,
39  mandatory indemnity systems for farmers
40  and running homes for the 
elderly.
41  The same is not true, however, for the organisation of second and third pillar 
(complementary and voluntary) pension schemes,
42 or the operation of ambulance services.
43  
In order to ascertain whether an activity is sufficiently connected to the exercise of public 
authority, the Court examines its nature, its aim, and the rules to which it is subject.
44  
The case law is more abundant concerning solidarity, but it is not always easy to know in 
advance how much strong the solidarity element of an activity needs to be, for it not to qualify 
as economic.
45 From a relatively long series of judgments concerning essentially pension and 
healthcare funds,
46  it follows that elements which would point to a non-economic activity, 
include:
47 (a) social objective pursued, (b) compulsory nature of participation/contribution, (c) 
contributions paid being related to the income of the insured person, not to the nature of the 
risk covered, (d) benefits accruing to insured persons not being directly linked to contributions 
paid by them, (e) benefits and contributions being determined under the control or the 
supervision of the state, (f) strong overall state control, (g) funds collected being redistributed, 
and not capitalized and/or invested, (i) cross-subsidization between different schemes, and (j) 
                                                            
37 See Hervey, T., ‘“Social Solidarity”: A Buttress against Internal Market Law?’ in Shaw, J. (ed), 
Social Law and Policy in an Evolving EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 31-47; see also Dougan, 
M., ‘Expanding the Frontiers of EU Citizenship by Dismantling the Territorial Boundaries of the 
National Welfare States?’ in Barnard, C. and Odudu, O. (eds), The Outer Limtis of EU Law 
(Oxford/ Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 119-65; generally on the issue of solidarity, see also 
Houtepen, R. and Ter Meulen, R., ‘New Types of Solidarity in the European Welfare State’ (2000) 
8 Health Care Analysis 329-40; White, J., ‘Rethinking Transnational Solidarity in the EU’ (2003) 20 
Perspectives  40-57; and on a more philosophical tone, see recently the edited volume by 
Karagiannis, N., European Solidarity (Liverpool: LUP, 2007). 
38 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637. 
39 Case C-218/00 Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v. Istituto nazionale per l'assicurazione 
contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL) [2002] ECR I-691; Case C-350/07 Kattner Stahlbau GmbH 
[2009] ECR I-1513. 
40 Case C-355/00 Freskot AE [2003] ECR I-5263. 
41 Case C-70/95 Sodemare SA [1997] ECR I-3395. 
42 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, C-155-157/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025, and C-
219/97 Drijvende [1999] ECR I-6121. 
43 Case C-475/99 Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-8089; Case 
C-160/08 Commission v Germany (ambulance services) [2010] ECR nyr. 
44 See Case C-343/95 Cali [1997] ECR I-154, paras 22-23, and the AG opinion in this same case, 
paras 41-42. 
45 See, in this respect, Neergaard, U., ‘In Search of the Role of “Solidarity” in Primary Law and the 
Case Law of the ECJ’ in Neergaard, U. Nielsen, R., and Roseberry, L. (eds), The Role of Courts in 
Developing a European Social Model: Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives (Copenhagen: 
DJØF Publishing, 2010) 97-138; Ross, M., ‘The Value of Solidarity in European Public Services 
Law’ in Krajewski, M., Neergard, U., and van de Gronden, J. (eds), The Changing Legal 
Framework for Services of General Interest (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2009) 81-99. 
46 Cited for the most in n 38 to 42, above; on these three cases see Idot, L., ‘Droit Social et droit de 
la concurrence: confrontation ou cohabitation: A propos de quelques développements 
récents’(1999) 9:11 Europe  4-8; Case C-218/00  Cisal  [2002] ECR I-691; Case T-319/99, 
Federación Española de Empresas de, Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Commission, [2003] ECR 
II-357, upheld by the Court in Case C-205/03P FENIN [2006] ECR I-6295; Case C-355/00 Freskot 
[2003] ECR I-5263; Joined cases C-264/01, C-306, 354, 355/01 AOK [2004] ECR I-2493. 
47 Note that these are broadly the same, but taken from the reverse side, to the ones used to 
identify contracting entities in the sense of public procurement law (see under subheading IV.a).   12 
non-existence of competitive schemes offered by private operators.
48 None of these elements 
seems to be decisive on its own and, indeed, many of them may be criticized. In particular, 
requirements (a), (b), (f), and (i) above have all been accused for failing to account for the 
diversity of social systems in the EU and for countering modernization and rationalization 
efforts.
49 
The above findings may be summarised in the following graph. 
 
 
While the vast majority of activities qualify as being economic and are fully subject to the EU 
rules, the ones which require some attention are brought under the umbrella category of 
SGIs. SGIs may be economic (SGEIs), in which case they are subject to a ‘‘limited’ 
application of EU law, or non-economic (NESGIs), in which case they evade the application of 
EU law altogether. Between the two categories, social services (SSGIs), without being 
qualified as economic are increasingly subject to pressure from the EU rules. With the 
exception of a few cases, however, the boundary between SGEIs and NESGIs is shifting and 
unpredictable. If the Commission and the Court have the tendency to encroach upon the 
scope of NESGIs and to hold the EU rules applicable to an ever increasing number of SGIs, 
                                                            
48 For a more detailed analysis of those criteria, see Hatzopoulos, V., ‘Health law and policy: the 
impact of the EU’ in de Burca, G. (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005) 123-60. For a critical view of the Court’s meddling with social funds, see also 
Kessler, F., ‘Droit de la concurrence et régimes de protection sociale: un bilan provisoire’ in Kovar, 
R., and Simon, D. (eds), Service public et Communauté Européenne: entre l’intérêt général et le 
marché, Vol. I, (Paris: La documentation française, 1998) 421-46, at 430, where further reference 
to other commentators. 
49 Hervey, T., ‘“Social Solidarity”: A Buttress against Internal Market Law?’ in Shaw, J. (ed), Social 
Law and Policy in an Evolving EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 31-47, also available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/2294/01/002338_1.PDF. 
     
2. Basic distinctions: economic   vs  non - economic 
All Activities 
Economic activities  SGIs 
SGEIs  NESGIs 
SSGIs 
Core  
SGEI 
Fundraising 
SGEI 
Full EU impact  NO EU impact  Moderate EU impact   13 
two countervailing movements should be acknowledged: first, the quality of SGEI provision is 
a consideration increasingly taken into account by the EU Institutions, capable of setting aside 
the EU rules; second, ever since the judgment in Corbeau,
50 and even more clearly so under 
the  Glöckner  case law,
51  the EU Institutions are ready to allow special rules, such as 
exclusive rights, not only in favour of activities which themselves qualify as SGEIs (core 
SGEIs), but also in favour of purely economic activities which, nonetheless, serve to finance 
some SGEI (fundraising SGEIs). 
 
 
IV. Substituting more technical criteria in order to define the scope of application of EU 
law 
In view of the fluidity of the above distinctions, and of their political salience, the Court in the 
vast majority of cases where it is called to decide on the applicability of the EU rules on the 
various activities, does not enter at all the slippery slope of distinguishing between the 
economic and the non-economic. Instead, it uses several other, more technical criteria, in 
order to determine to which extent EU law shall apply – if at all – to any given activity. 
In order to test the above hypothesis, the following analysis scrutinizes, step by step, the 
reasoning of the Court under both internal market and competition rules. Indeed, the cases 
brought before the Court are decided on the basis of answers to six basic questions, out of 
which the nature of the activity is only one: (a) the nature (public/private) of the body at the 
origin of the measure, (b) the nature (economic/non-economic) of the activity, (c) the object of 
the measure (regulating an economic activity/non-economic activity, such as sport etc.), (d) 
the existence of mitigating factors to the violation of the EU rules (morality, rule of reason, de 
minimis etc.), (e) the applicability of exceptions (expressly provided by the Treaty or judge-
made), and (f) the applicability of Article 106(2).
52  
Not all the questions are dealt with in every single case, nor are they always formulated in the 
above sequence, nor, even, in comparable terms. Led by judicial economy, the Court gives 
priority to the question(s) offering the most credible solution, in view of the specifics of each 
case, with the least judicial effort. Very few are the cases, if any, where all the questions are 
raised by the Court. Taken together, however, the various cases may be systematized, 
offering a blueprint of the Court’s approach, susceptible of universal application. Indeed, it 
could be said that the first two criteria (a and b, above) serve to qualify the existence of a 
violation of EU law, the second two criteria (c and d, above) serve to disqualify the existence 
of a violation, while the last two (e and f, above) serve as exceptions – general and special, 
respectively – to the application of the Treaty rules. 
                                                            
50 Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2562. 
51 Case C-475/99 Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-8089. 
52 Article 106(2) is a Treaty exception and could well be integrated in category (e), but is being kept 
distinct, since it is the only Treaty provision specifically aimed at ‘setting aside’ services which 
require some protection from market forces.    14 
In order for the argument to be more accurate, and thus more convincing, the general internal 
market law (free movement rules) is distinguished from the more specific public procurement 
rules, while the competition rules concerning private conduct (Articles 101 and 102) are 
distinguished (whenever necessary) from the ones on state aid (Article 107). Moreover, 
Article 106(2), instituting an express exception in consideration of the nature of the activities 
concerned, is distinguished from other grounds for exception. These tests are briefly 
presented in the following paragraphs.
53 
 
A. Nature of the body subject to the rules  
1. Free movement  
For the free movement rules to apply, the principle is simple: only public entities, central or 
decentralized, are subject to them. This, however, has been extended in two directions. First, 
entities created, run or else controlled by the state are assimilated to it, irrespective of their 
legal nature. Therefore, a development body established by the state,
54 an informal trade 
Council,
55 as well as a private society entrusted with special rights
56 have all been held to be 
subject to the internal market rules. Secondly, entities, even private in nature, which exercise 
de jure or de facto some regulatory activity need also respect the internal market rules: sports 
associations or federations,
57 professional associations,
58 insurance funds,
59 trade unions
60 
and even automobile associations.
61  
 
2. Public procurement 
Public procurement rules and principles only apply to contracting authorities or, in the broader 
terms used in Directive 2004/17,
62  to contracting entities. The same is true about the 
‘procurement principles’ devised by the Court’s case law and based on transparency (also 
                                                            
53 For a comprehensive view of the various test, refer to the table in annex. 
54 Case 102/86 Apple and Pear Development Council [1988] ECR 1443. 
55 Case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland (buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005. 
56 Joined Cases 266 and 267/97 R v. Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, ex parte 
Association of Pharmaceutical Importers and others [1989] ECR 1295. 
57 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405; Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero 
[1976] ECR 1333; Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. 
Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others, and Union des 
associations européennes de football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; Joined 
cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549; Case T-313/02  Meca-Medina [2004] 
ECR II-3291. 
58 Case 292/86 Gullung v. Conseil de l’ ordre des avocats du barreau de Colmar [1988] ECR 111; 
Case C-309/99  Wouters  [2002] ECR I-1577; Case C-506/04  Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des 
avocats du barreau de Luxembourg [2006] ECR I-8613; Joined cases C-94 & 202/04 Federico 
Cipolla v. Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese and Stefano Macrino and Claudio Capopart v. Roberto 
Meloni [2006] ECR I-11421. 
59 See, among several cases, Case C-158/96 Köhll [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-157/99 Smits-
Peerbooms  [2001] ECR I-5473, and all the recent case law concerning the free movement of 
patients. 
60 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767.  
61 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. Elliniko Dimosio [2008] 
ECR I-4863.   15 
referred to as ‘the transparency case law’).
63 Contracting entities are the state and its sub-
divisions, as well as ‘bodies governed by public law’: these are bodies which i. have legal 
personality, ii. are established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general 
interest, not having an industrial or commercial character, and iii. are financed for the most 
part, are subject to management supervision or have an administrative, managerial, or 
supervisory board, whose majority is appointed by the state or its sub-divisions.  
Condition (iii) which is the one directly concerned with the nature of the entity, is in fact very 
similar to the test followed for the application of the internal market rules: irrespective of the 
legal nature of the entity concerned, the rules apply to the extent that the entity’s conduct can 
be attributed to the state. Through a highly technical body of case law, the Court has 
considerably extended the reach of the procurement rules, by stretching the concept of 
contracting authorities/entities.
64 
 
3. Competition and state aids rules: nature of body irrelevant 
The application of competition rules, both those concerning private conduct and those on 
state aid depends on the qualification of the entities concerned (acting or beneficiaries) as 
‘undertakings’. Such qualification is independent of the legal nature of the entity concerned. In 
its seminal judgment in Höfner, the Court held that  
‘in the context of competition law […] the concept of an undertaking encompasses every 
entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way 
in which it is financed’.
65 
In subsequent cases, the Court further explained that the entity concerned need not be a 
profit making undertaking, but may as well be a non-profit making body.
66  
Therefore, contrary to the internal market rules, where the nature of the entity is the only (free 
movement) or the main (public procurement) criterion on which their application rests, for 
competition rules, such nature is completely irrelevant.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
62  European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors 
[2004] OJ L134/1. 
63  For this case law, see ch 6 below; See also Hatzopoulos, V., and Stergiou, H., ‘Public 
Procurement for Healthcare Services: From Theory to Practice’ in van de Gronden, J., Krajewski, 
M., Neergaard, U., and Szyszczak, E. (eds), Health Care and EU Law (The Hague: TMC Asser 
Press, 2011) 413-452. 
64 See Sauter, W., and Schepel, H., State and Market in EU Law: The Public and Private Spheres 
of the Internal Market before the EU Courts (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 51-55. 
65 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21. A somehow more helpful definition 
was offered in the early ECSC Case 19/61 Mannesman AG v. High Authority of the ECSC [1962] 
ECR 357, para 371 and Joined Cases 17/61 & 20/61 Klöckner-Werke AG and Hoesch AG v. High 
Authority of the ECSC  [1962] ECR 325, para 341: ‘an undertaking is constituted by a single 
organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements, attached to an autonomous legal entity 
and pursuing a given long term economic aim’. 
66 See e.g. Case C-244/94 Fédération Française des Sociétés d'Assurance, Société Paternelle-
Vie, Union des Assurances de Paris-Vie and Caisse d'Assurance et de Prévoyance Mutuelle des 
Agriculteurs (FFSA) v. Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche [1995] ECR I-4013, para 21.    16 
 
4. General assessment of the nature of the entity criterion 
From the above, it becomes clear that the nature of the entity is of absolute importance for 
free movement rules, as non-public measures are a priori excluded from their scope; it is of 
relative importance for the public procurement rules, as state control/financing constitutes one 
important criterion (out of three) for their applicability; and it is of no importance at all for the 
competition rules. Therefore, an important difference in the scope of application of the 
relevant rules stems from this first criterion used by the Court. 
 
B. Nature of the activity 
1. Free movement 
As stated above, the nature of the entity involved is critical for the application of free 
movement rules. The nature of the activity only comes into play in the form of an exception; or 
two.  
Article 45(4) TFEU provides an exception to the free movement of workers in the public 
service. At the same time, Article 51 TFEU expressly foresees that the right of establishment 
and (in combination with Article 62 TFEU) the free provision of services, do not apply to 
activities which are related to the exercise of official authority in the host state. These 
exceptions have been interpreted in a restrictive manner.  
The concept of public service has been held to be a concept of EU law, confined to activities 
(not entire posts)
67 which involve substantial participation in the state’s effort to exercise its 
functions and/or to safeguard the general interest, thus requiring a special relationship of 
allegiance to the state.
68 Similarly, the concept of public authority under Article 51 TFEU has 
been restricted to activities genuinely involving the exercise of authority and legally binding 
decisions – not mere preparatory or other collateral functions.
69 Moreover, the position of the 
Court has shifted from previous case law, and it would seem that civil aspects of public 
authority, such as the registration of contracts, births, marriages, and wills does not amount, 
in the absence of any power of decision-making or of coercion, to the exercise of public 
authority.
70 
Next to these Treaty provisions whereby the application of the free movement rules may be 
sidestepped on grounds of public authority, a second ground seems to be put forward by the 
                                                            
67 Case C-451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v. Giuseppe Calafiori [2006] ECR I-
2941, para 47; Case C-173/94 Commission v. Belgium (employment in the public service) [1997] 
ECR I-3265, and Case 290/94 Commission v. Greece (employment in the public service) [1996] 
ECR I-3285. 
68 See also Sauter, W., and Schapel, H., 2009, n 64 above, at 61; see also, among many, Case 
225/85 Commission v. Italy (employment in the NRC) [1987] ECR 2625; Case C-4/91 Annegret 
Bleis v. Ministère de l'Education Nationale  [1991] ECR I-5627; Case C-473/93  Commission v. 
Luxembourg (employment in the public service) [1997] ECR I-3207. 
69 See e.g. Case C-404/05 Commission v. Germany (organic agricultural products) [2007] ECR I-
10239; Case C-393/05 Commission v. Austria (organic agricultural products) [2007] ECR I-10195. 
70  See Case C-52/08  Commission v Portugal (notaries) [2011] ECR nyr and Case C-53/08 
Commission v Austria (notaries) [2011] ECR nyr, partly reversing Case C-405/01  Collegio de 
Oficiales de la marina mercante Espanola [2003] ECR I-10391.   17 
Court: solidarity. Solidarity is a ground for disapplying the Treaty rules essentially in the field 
of competition law, along the lines discussed earlier in the present article. It has been used by 
the Court in order to exclude the application of the free movement in cases such as 
Sodemare, Freskot and, more recently, Piatowski;
71 such use is distinct from solidarity as yet 
another overriding reason of public interest serving to justify restrictive measures.
72  
 
2. Public procurement 
As stated above, the nature of the activity pursued constitutes one out of the three tests for 
identifying a ‘contracting authority/entity’ (the other two being the existence of legal 
personality and state control). Therefore, technically, it is integrated in the first question, that 
of the nature of the entity. In this framework, however, the issue of the activity pursued is 
always treated separately. Indeed, according to Article 1(9) of the Public Procurement 
Directive,
73  the first condition for identifying a body governed by public law is that it is 
‘established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an 
industrial or commercial character’.
74 
Three remarks need be made in respect of the nature of the activities which make an entity 
qualify as a contracting entity.
75  
First, the fact that some competition by private undertakings may or does actually exist, does 
not automatically rule out the possibility that such activities are offered by the public entity in 
the general interest.
76  It is only when the entity in question ‘operates in normal market 
conditions, aims to make a profit, and bears the losses associated with the exercise of its 
activity’ that the Court is satisfied that it is not going to take economically unsound decisions; 
only then will the Court leave the entity unconstrained by the public procurement rules.
77 It 
should be noted, already here, that the very same conditions, of profit seeking and, more 
                                                            
71 Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395; Case C-355/00 Freskot [2003] ECR I-5263; Case 
C-493/04 L.H. Piatkowski v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst grote ondernemingen Eindhoven 
[2006] ECR I-2369. 
72 Hervey, T., ‘“Social Solidarity”: A Buttress against Internal Market Law?’ in Shaw, J. (ed), Social 
Law and Policy in an Evolving EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 31-47, also available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/2294/01/002338_1.PDF  (last accessed on 28/11/2011); she observes that the 
same ambivalence of solidarity is also true in relation to the competition rules, since e.g. in Albany, 
the Court found that the activity in question did not possess sufficient solidarity features to be 
brought altogether outside the scope of the Treaty, but could, nonetheless, justify an exception 
under Art 106(2) TFEU (Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751). 
73 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ 
L134/114. 
74 See e.g. Case C-360/96 BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821, paras 50-1, and Case C-18/01 
Korhonen [2003] ECR I-5321, para 47. 
75 Further on this issue, see Bovis, C., EC Public Procurement: Case law and Regulation (Oxford: 
OUP, 2006) ch 7; Arrowsmith, S., The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2005) ch 5. 
76 C-18/01 Korhonen, n 74 above, paras 43-4, where the Court gives two reasons for such a 
finding: first, that even if there is competition, a body financed or controlled by the state may 
nonetheless be guided by non-economic considerations; secondly, that it is hard to imagine any 
activities that could not in any circumstances be carried out by private undertakings. 
77 Ibid, para 51.   18 
decisively, of cost bearing, are also used by the Court – in reverse – in order to determine the 
existence of undertakings.
78 
Secondly, if the entity’s activities are partly ‘in the general interest’ and partly within the 
market, the entity is subject to the procurement rules even for contracts which relate to its 
purely competitive activities. This ‘infection’ or ‘contamination’ theory,
79 has been introduced 
by the Court in Mannesmann and confirmed ever since.
80 
Thirdly, contrary to the definition of SGEIs, or of the concept of solidarity, for which the Court 
tries to put forward its own set of criteria and to control in extremis the choices made by the 
member states,
81 member states seem to have a free hand in deciding the activities which 
they keep under their responsibility, thus subjecting them to the procurement rules: their 
objective is not to constrain the member states’ choices concerning the services they offer to 
their population, but rather to make sure that, while providing those services for their citizens, 
member states respect the principles of objectiveness, transparency, and equal treatment.  
In other words, regulation by the state is always presumed to have some impact on economic 
activity and is, thus, subject to the free movement rules – unless some direct connection to 
the exercise of public authority can be shown. Economic dealings of the state, on the other 
hand, are either within the market, in which case the competition rules do, in principle, apply 
to them; or they operate in the pursuance of the general interest, in which case the public 
procurement rules apply to them. Neither qualification excludes altogether the application of 
EU law, and, therefore, there is no teleological argument for favouring on or the other 
qualification.  
The above observations demonstrate that the notion of serving needs of general interest, for 
the purposes of public procurement, is much wider than the notion of the exercise of public 
authority, for the purposes of the free movement rules. In economic terms, it could be said 
that the former corresponds to ‘merit goods’ while the latter is confined to a restrictive vision 
of ‘public goods’.  
 
3. Competition and state aid rules 
It has been briefly explained above that for the application of the competition rules, the nature 
of the entity involved is completely irrelevant. What does count, on the other hand, is the 
activity pursued. Such activity should satisfy two requirements to qualify as economic. First, it 
should consist ‘in offering goods and services in a given market’. Buying into a market does 
not, on its own, qualify as an economic activity, if such purchase is not connected to a 
                                                            
78 See e.g. C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, paras 48-49. 
79 For the use of the term ‘infection’, see Sauter, W., and Schepel, H., State and Market in EU Law: 
The Public and Private Spheres of the Internal Market before the EU Courts (Cambridge: CUP, 
2009), at 54; however, the term ‘contamination’ seems to be describing more accurately the legal 
situation. 
80 Case C-44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau [1998] ECR I-73, para 26, subsequently confirmed ia 
in Case C-373/00 Truley [2003] ECR I-1931, para 56, and Case C-18/01 Korhonen, n 74 above, 
para 58. 
81 For the control by the Court of the concept of SGEI put forward by the member states, see the 
analysis in A(3)a(iv) above.   19 
commercial activity.
82 Secondly, the entity offering goods and services should be bearing the 
financial risks of the activity
83 – an activity which need not be pursued for profit,
84 but which is 
‘capable of being carried on, at least in principle, by a private undertaking with a view to 
profit’.
85 This last condition is interpreted in an extremely wide manner, the criterion used 
being that the activity in question ‘has not always been and is not necessarily’ exercised 
outside the market.
86 It has been observed in this respect that ‘it is not actual competition or 
even potential competition that is relevant, but hypothetical competition’.
87 
The above two conditions make for a very extensive concept of ‘undertaking’, made even 
broader by the Court’s expansive view of the concept of ‘associations of undertakings’ 
contained in the Treaty.
88  
The two boundaries to the scope ratione materiae of competition rules, stemming from the 
nature of the activity pursued, have been discussed above:
89 activities bearing the mark of 
public authority and activities which embody the principle of solidarity. Both the exercise of 
public authority and of solidarity functions transform an otherwise economic activity into a 
non-economic one.  
Furthermore, the Court has developed a theory of ‘severability’ in the field of competition law 
whereby  
‘since the Treaty provisions on competition are applicable to the activities of an entity which can 
be severed from those which it engages as a public authority, the various activities of an entity 
must be considered individually and the treatment of some of them as powers of a public 
authority does not mean that it must be concluded that the other activities are not economic.’
90 
The existence and precise scope of a theory of severability is, however, unclear: albeit 
commonly used in cases involving the activities of public authorities, this theory has been 
resisted (admittedly only on procedural grounds) by the Grand Chamber of the Court in 
FENIN in relation to solidarity activities.
91 
 
4. General assessment of the activity criterion 
It is clear from the above that in all four fields of law examined, the qualification of an activity 
as economic or non-economic follows the same basic pattern: activities are presumed to be 
                                                            
82 See e.g. a highly authoritative, although thoroughly disputed, judgment in Case C-205/03 P 
FENIN [2006] ECR I-6295, para 25; for this judgment see, among many, Krajewski, M. and Farley, 
M., ‘Non-economic activities in upstream and downstream markets and the scope of competition 
law after FENIN’ (2007) 32 EL Rev 111-24. 
83 See e.g. Case C-309/99 Wouters, n 58 above, paras 48-9. 
84 Case C-244/94 FFSA [1995] ECR I-4013, para 21. 
85 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43, para 9. 
86 Case C-41/90 Höfner [1991] ECR I-1979, para 22. 
87 Sauter, W., and Schapel, H., 2009 n 64 above, at 82. 
88 See e.g. Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, paras 48-49. 
89 In the relevant section concerning the nature of the body involved. 
90 T-155/04 SELEX Sistemi Integrati [2006] ECR II-4797 para 54; and before that, see Case C-
82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v. Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR I-9297, 
paras 75seq.  
91 One of the arguments put forward by the plaintiffs, and ignored by the Court, was that the 
Spanish SNS was not only providing services to the population for  free, but was in parallel 
engaging into the commercial provision of healthcare, in particular to the attention of foreign 
nationals; see C-205/03 P FENIN [2006] ECR I-6295, para 9.   20 
economic, unless they are shown to be connected either to the exercise of public authority, or 
to solidarity: the identification of an activity entailing public authority or solidarity functions will 
exclude the application of the free movement and the competition rules, but at the same time, 
will trigger that of the public procurement ones.  
The concept of public authority which serves to exclude the application of the rules on free 
movement (under Art 51 TFEU), and on competition (under the above-mentioned case law of 
the Court) seems to be having common grounding. Similarly, the concept of solidarity seems 
to be unique and its effects on the application of the various sets of rules are comparable. 
Moreover, both concepts are concepts of EU law and subject to review by the CJEU.  
In addition, the requirement  that  undertakings  bring goods/services into  the market fits 
perfectly with the opposite requirement that contracting entities operate outside the market. 
An entity which buys (without selling) into the market, and then, offers goods or services (free 
of charge) to the population, is not an undertaking;
92 it is, nonetheless, subject to the public 
procurement rules. Similarly, the condition that an undertaking should bear the risks of its own 
operations, combines well with the idea that entities which shift their risks to the state are 
subject to the procurement rules.
93  
Therefore, a systemic coherence seems to be emerging from the application of the above 
concepts: the free movement and competition rules apply whenever there is a market, in 
order to ensure competition  in  the market. The procurement rules apply whenever the 
exercise of authority, solidarity, or other state functions exclude competition from the market; 
they are destined to secure competition for the market. By the same token, it seems prima 
facie that any given entity is either an undertaking or a contracting authority, but never both.  
The devil, however, is in the detail: while the solidarity argument has been extensively tested 
as a means of excluding the application of the competition rules, it has only rarely been used 
in the same way under the free movement rules;
94  ‘needs of general interest’ and, 
consequently, the concept of contracting entity, have been interpreted in too wide a manner in 
the field of public procurement; while on the competition end, ‘undertaking’ has also been 
interpreted very widely, especially in view of a. the fact that even hypothetical competition is 
enough, and b. the uncertainties of the theory of ‘severability’ (i.e. the idea that the same 
entity may qualify as an undertaking for some of its activities and as a public authority for 
others). 
Such differences account for the fact that several entities may, at the same time, be subject to 
competition and public procurement rules. This is especially true for entities engaged in the 
provision of services broadly associated to the general interest, such as healthcare.
95 This, 
                                                            
92 Ibid. 
93 See the discussion in subsection B(2)b above. 
94 As noted above, in the free movement case law, solidarity is essentially expressed through the 
‘financial equilibrium’ ORPI; see also the discussion under subheading B(5) below. 
95 See on this issue, Hatzopoulos, V., ‘Public procurement and state aid in national healthcare 
systems’ in Mossialos, E., Permanand, G., Baeten, R., and Hervey, T. (eds), Health Systems 
Governance in Europe: the role of EU law and policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 381-420; 
Hatzopoulos, V., ‘Financing national health care in a transnational environment: the impact of the 
EC internal market’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin Int L J 761-804; more generally, on the topic, see Bovis,   21 
however, seems to be an undesirable outcome, as the two sets of rules should be mutually 
exclusive. From a systemic viewpoint, it has been shown that  they are deemed to cover 
different situations and to achieve different outcomes (competition in  the market v. 
competition  for  the market). The two qualifications are supposed to be opposites: ‘the 
exercise of an economic activity’ is the criterion for identifying an undertaking, while, on the 
other hand, a contracting entity is one which ‘does not pursue an activity of economic or 
commercial nature’. One of the fundamental principles of market economy is that economic 
operators should be free to contract with whomever they wish:
96 any given entity should not, it 
is submitted, be subject simultaneously to free competition and to the restrictive and time-
consuming rules on public procurement. 
 
C. The object of a measure 
The third question examined by the Court has to do with the object of any given measure. 
There is great controversy in legal literature whether measures restricting trade should be 
tested only as to their object, or also as to their effect. Under WTO law, despite strong voices 
in favour of looking solely at the object of measures,
 97 effects are also taken into account.
98  
In the EU, ever since the foundational free movement judgments, in Dassonville, Van 
Binsbergen, Reyners, Cassis de Dijon etc.,
99 it has become clear that what matters, at least 
at  the qualification stage, are the effects of measures. This has led to judicial excesses, 
denounced by several authors,
100 and even by the Court itself, notably in Keck – and more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
C., ‘The Conceptual Links Between State Aid and Public Procurement in the Financing of Services 
of General Interest’ in Krajewski, M., Neergard, U., and van de Gronden, J. (eds), The Changing 
Legal Framework for Services of General Interest (The Hague: Asser Press, 2009) 149-70; Bovis, 
C., ‘Financing Services of General Interest in the EU: How do Public Procurement and State Aids 
Interact to Demarcate between Market Forces and Protection?’ (2005) 11 ELJ 79-109. 
96  This ‘freedom to deal’ is known in competition law as the ‘Colgate doctrine’ from the US 
Supreme’s Court judgment in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
97 Regan, D., ‘Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade within a Federal or Quasi-
federal system: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo’ (2001) 99 Michigan L Rev 1853-902; see 
also Regan, D., ‘What Are Trade Agreements For?: Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, 
with a Lesson for Lawyers’  (2006) 9 J Int Economic L 951-88; and more recently, in the EU 
context, Regan, D., ‘An Outsider’s View of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon: On Interpretation and 
Policy’, in Poiares Maduro, M., and Azoulai, L. (eds), The Past and the Future of EU Law: The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty  (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010) 465-73. 
98 For a discussion of the relevant case law see, among many, Leroux, E., ‘Eleven years of GATS 
case law: What have we learned?’ (2007) 10  J of Int Economic L  749-93; Ortino, F., ‘Treaty 
interpretation and the WTO appellate body report in US-Gambling: A critique’ (2006) 9 J of Int 
Economic L 117-48; and Leitner, K., and Lester, S., ‘WTO dispute settlement from 1995 to 2005: A 
statistical analysis’ (2006) 9 J of Int Economic L 219-31. 
99 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, Case 33/74 Johannes Hervicus 
Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 
1299, Case 2/74 Jean Reyners v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 631, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG 
v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
100 For most ‘classic’ criticism, see Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc [1989] 
ECR I-3851 (AG); White, E.L., ‘In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty (1989) 26 
CML Rev 235-80; Mortelmans, K., ‘Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to Market 
Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition?’ (1991) 28 CML Rev 115-36.   22 
explicitly by AG Tesauro in his opinion in Hünermund
101 Legal doctrine has come up with 
various theories in order to re-center the EU’s focus on measures which are truly restrictive of 
trade: discrimination, de minimis rule, remoteness, double burdens, to state but a few; 
102 the 
recent ‘rediscovery’ of ‘market access’ as the defining criterion is yet an expression of this 
need.
103  
The Court for its part, has indicated that the object of the measures brought to it is to be taken 
into account, in a negative manner; in two ways: either to set a (rebuttable) presumption of 
not being capable of hindering trade, where their object is to regulate selling arrangements,
104 
or to exclude measures from its scrutiny all together, when they are alien to the regulation of 
economic activity. It is this latter category which is of interest here.  
 
1. Free movement 
The most explicit expression of the idea that some regulations are, by nature, alien to the 
exercise of economic activity, is the Court’s judgment in Deliège, concerning sporting rules. In 
this judgment, the Court held that  
‘the Treaty provisions concerning freedom of movement for persons do not prevent the 
adoption of rules or practices [imposing restrictions] for reasons which are not of an economic 
nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such [activity].
105 
Or, put differently, ‘those rules do not constitute restrictions on freedom of movement because 
they concern questions of purely sporting interest and, as such, have nothing to do with 
economic activity’.
106 Therefore, the subject matter of the measures brings them outside the 
scope of the free movement rules, to the extent that limitations thereto are ‘inherent’ in the 
nature of the measures.
107 
 
2. Public procurement 
For the procurement rules to apply, there needs to be a contract. This is expressed by the 
criterion of constituting a ‘contracting authority’, i.e. the requirement that the awarding entity 
has legal personality (the other two being state control and the pursuance of some activity in 
                                                            
101  Joined cases C-267 & 268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard  [1993] ECR I-6097; opinion of AG Tesauro of 27 October 1993 in case C-292/92 
Hünermund [1993] ECR I-6787. 
102 For a recent restatement of the relevant literature and some further thoughts, see Spaventa, E., 
‘The Outer Limits of the Treaty Free Movement Provisions: Some Reflections on the Significance 
of Keck, Remoteness, and Deliège’ in Barnard, C. and Odudu, O. (eds), The Outer Limits of EU 
Law (Oxford/ Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 245-69; for a more detailed discussion of the various 
tendencies, see ch 3 below. 
103  See Barnard, C.,  ‘Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?’ (2009) 68 
Cambridge L J 575-606; on a more critical tone, however, see on a more critical tone, Snell, J., 
‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 437-72; yet for the 
view that the market access criterion is no more than a return to the Dassonville formula see 
Gormley, L., ‘Free movement of goods and their use – What is the use of it?’ (2010) 33 Fordham 
Int’l L.J. 1589-628. 
104 C-267 & 268/91 Keck, n 101 above. 
105 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549, para 43. 
106 C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission of the European Communities 
[2006] ECR I-6991, para 31.   23 
the general interest)
108. If a public entity entrusts another public entity with the execution of a 
given mission, there is no contract between two different legal persons; the situation is closer 
to the concept of delegation. What is more, public money is not infused into the market, but 
remains within the instances of the state and the situation has thus no relevance for EU law.  
The way member states organize, merge or else restructure their services, in order to fulfil 
their obligations towards their citizens, is ‘cuisine interne’ and need not be constrained by the 
formal procurement rules. According to the Court’s judgment in Teckal and subsequent case 
law, such ‘in-house’ arrangements are not caught by the procurement rules and principles. 
The ‘in-house’ doctrine, introduced with great circumspection in the early Court judgments,
109 
has been consolidated and its scope has been extended by the recent judgments in ASEMFO 
v. Tragsa and, more importantly, Coditel.
110 The technicalities of the ‘in-house’ doctrine need 
not retain us here.
111 What is important, however, is that this doctrine stands for the idea that 
the organizational/operational arrangements adopted by member states in order to discharge 
their obligations towards their citizens are, by their nature, alien to the procurement rules. Just 
like sporting rules above, such arrangements are not caught by the free movement rules, 
although they do affect the market, because their primary aim is different and they are 
indispensable for the attainment of such an aim. 
 
3. Competition and state aids rules 
In the ‘trilogy’ cases concerning supplementary pension funds,
112  the Court invented yet 
another use for solidarity, apart from the (dis)qualification of economic activity.
113  The 
question put to the Court was whether sector-specific collective agreements making affiliation 
compulsory to a single fund per sector, infringed competition rules. The Court found that the 
pension schemes in question were not impregnated enough by solidarity and held the funds 
                                                                                                                                                                      
107 C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège, n 57 above, para. 64. 
108 See more under subheading B(1)b above.  
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Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] 
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[2005] ECR I-8612; Case C-410/04 Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v. 
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110  Case C-295/05  Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v. Transformación 
Agraria SA (Tragsa) and Administración del Estado [2007] ECR I-2999; Case C-324/07 Coditel 
Brabant SA v. Commune d’Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale [2008] ECR I-8457.  
111 For a recent account of all the relevant case law, see Frenz, W., and Schleissing, P., ‘The 
Never Ending Story of “In-house” Procurement’ in Krajewski, M., Neergard, U., and van de 
Gronden, J. (eds), The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest (The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press, 2009) 171-87; Kaarresalo, T., ‘Procuring in-house: the impact of the EC 
procurement regime’ (2008) 17 Public Procurement L Rev  242-54; see also the various 
contributions in Comba, M., and Treumer, S. (eds), The In House Providing in European Law 
(Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2010). 
112 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, C-155-157/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025, and C-
219/97 Drijvende [1999] ECR I-6121, respectively. On these three cases, see Idot, L., ‘Droit Social 
et droit de la concurrence: confrontation ou cohabitation: A propos de quelques développements 
récents’(1999) 9:11 Europe 4-8. 
113 For which see the analysis under subheading B(2)c above.   24 
to qualify as undertakings.
114 It accepted, however, that the agreements concluded between 
employers and employees, making affiliation compulsory lied outside the scope of Article 101 
TFEU.
115 In order to reach this conclusion, the Court referred to the nature and to the purpose 
of the agreements. For the former, the Court held that such agreements were the fruit of 
social dialogue, a form of negotiation enshrined in the EU Treaty (Article 152 TFEU). As for 
the latter, i.e. the purpose of the agreement, the Court found that it contributed directly to 
improving one of the employees’ working conditions, namely, their remuneration.
116 The Court 
explained that  
‘It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective 
agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the social 
policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management 
and labour were subject to Article 85(1) [now 101(1) TFEU]’.
117 
In these judgments, again, the idea is clearly expressed that agreements, the nature and 
purpose of which are primarily non-economic, are not caught by the Treaty economic rules 
(here, rules on competition), even if they do have restrictive effects; at least to the extent that 
such restrictive effects are ‘inherent’ to the measures. 
118 
 
4. General assessment of the object of the measure 
From the above, it becomes clear that next to the nature of the entity and of the activity 
pursued, the ‘nature and object’ of the measure/agreement involved are also taken into 
account. In other words, the Court recognizes that in some circumstances, even if the effects 
of a measure/agreement do restrict the application of EU rules, the object of such 
measure/agreement serves to obliterate the restrictive effects. In this sense, it may be said 
that the Court does follow an idiosyncratic reverse ‘object and effects doctrine’, whereby a 
positively valued object serves to legitimise negatively valued effects; subject to a strict test of 
proportionality, expressed through the condition that restrictions should be ‘inherent’ in the 
measure. 
 
D. Mitigating factors – threshold of interference  
Measures/agreements which are in breach of Treaty rules are, occasionally, left unscathed. 
This is because the level of interference they cause is not intolerable. This may be the case 
either because its effects are too minor (de minimis) or too uncertain (remoteness); or 
because the interference is necessary for the achievement of some other objective internal 
(ancillary restrictions) or external (rule of reason) to the measure/agreement examined. 
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It is not the place here to elaborate on these theories, as each of these would require 
separate monographs. Very briefly, however, it may be shown how they all serve the same 
function, as part of the wider discussion on the economic/ non-economic activity conundrum. 
 
a. Free movement 
The Court, while defining the concept of restriction in an extensive way has nonetheless, 
provided ‘escape routes’ through which national measures forego its scrutiny. In this way, the 
Court consciously mitigates the intensity of its own control over national measures, thus 
allowing member states some leeway to pursue their regulatory choices, without being 
subject to a strict test of necessity and proportionality. These various escape routes are 
inherent in the definition of the concept of ‘restriction’ and constitute the topic of detailed and 
knowledgable analyses by other authors.
119  
 
b. Public procurement 
The same objective as above is openly followed in the field of public procurement, in more 
than one way. First, the Procurement Directives apply to operations, the economic value of 
which is higher than a given threshold. Thresholds differ depending on the object of 
procurement (goods and services on the one hand, construction on the other), on whether the 
purchasing authority belongs to the central or decentralized administration, and on the activity 
concerned by the operation, utilities being subject to different thresholds; they are regularly 
revised. Thresholds clearly stand for a de minimis principle. Secondly, utilities procurement is 
subject to different (more flexible) rules than the ones applicable to the other sectors. Thirdly, 
even within traditional sectors, different services are listed in different annexes, and are, thus, 
subject to different rules. Therefore, for example, rail and water transport, as well as 
education, healthcare, and social services (all enumerated in annex IIB of the ‘general 
Directive’) are only subject to the ‘light’ procurement regime, namely the use of objective 
standards in the tendering documents and post-award publicity. Fourthly, the Directives only 
cover classic procurement procedures, to the exclusion of concession contracts and Public 
Private Partnerships. All the above arrangements leave member states with quite some 
leeway to organize the provision of services they deem ‘sensible’, outside the strict constrains 
of the procurement regime– but still subject to the procurement principles.
 120 
 
c. Competition rules– private conduct 
Several factors within the definitions of Articles 101 and, to a lesser extent, 102 TFEU operate 
as ‘mitigating factors’.  
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In Article 101(1) alone, well before the question of an exemption by virtue of Article 101(3) is 
ever raised, there are at least two doctrines which limit the scope of application of the Treaty. 
Article 101(1) prohibits agreements etc. ‘which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market’. The EU Courts and the 
Commission have been interpreting the above condition flexibly, by clearing collusive conduct 
which, on balance, is more beneficial than detrimental to competition. This practice is 
comparable to the American ‘rule of reason’ doctrine and indeed, has been qualified as such 
within the EU framework.
121 An issue which is highly disputed in EU legal doctrine is whether 
the balancing exercise imbued by the rule of reason also encompasses non-economic 
considerations; such debate has been nurtured by some isolated judgments of the Court, 
such as Wouters and Meca-Medina.
122  
Furthermore, next to the ‘rule of reason’ (or as part of it),
123 the Courts and the Commission 
have also developed the doctrine of ‘ancillary restraints’: restrictions which are strictly 
necessary to the achievement of the main purpose of the agreement and proportionate 
thereto, are admitted. This doctrine is of particular importance in the area of mergers, and has 
also been enshrined in successive Commission Notices.
124 
Furthermore, a de minimis doctrine has been introduced into EU competition law by the ECJ 
already in 1969 and has been fleshed out by successive Commission Notices.
125 
Moreover, the concept of concerted practice has, to some extent, been limited by the theory 
of oligopolistic interdependence.
126 
Similarly, in the framework of Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of dominance, both 
the concept of dominance and that of abuse are flexible ones, subject to various – often pro-
monopolistic – interpretations.
127 Dominance is questioned by the doctrine of contestability.
128 
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here. See, however, Joliet, R., The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law: American, German and 
Common Market Laws in Comparative (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); Fasquelle, D., Droit 
américain et droit communautaire des ententes: Etude de la règle de raison (Paris: Joly, 1993); 
and more briefly, Steindorff, E., ‘Article 85 and the Rule of Reason’ (1984) 21 CML Rev 639-46; 
Korah, V., ‘The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity: The Need for a Rule of Reason in EEC 
Antitrust’ (1981) 3 Northwestern J Int L and Business 320-57; see contra Whish, R., and Surfin, B., 
‘Article 85 and the Rule of Reason’ (1987) 7 YEL 1-38; Black, O., ‘Per Se Rules and Rules of 
Reason: What Are They?’ (1997) 3 Eur Competition L Rev 289-94. 
122 For reasons of coherence, these cases will be examined in more detail under subheading B(5)c 
below, despite the fact that they are technically part of an expanded ‘rule of reason’ doctrine.  
123 For a thorough presentation of the various doctrinal positions, see Werden, G., ‘The Ancillary 
Restraints Doctrine’ Paper presented in the ABA 54
th Antitrust Law Spring Meeting (2006), also 
available at http://www.abanet.org/ antitrust/at-committees/at-s1/pdf/spring-
materials/2006/werden06.pdf (last accessed on 28/11/2011). 
124 For the one currently in force, see Commission Notice on Restrictions Directly Related and 
Necessary to Concentrations [2005] OJ C56/24. 
125 Case 5/69 Franz Völk v. S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295; See also the Commission 
Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis) [2001] OJ C 368/13. 
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Abuse, for its part, may be proven against by the existence of some objective justification 
and/or on efficiency grounds,
129 despite the existence of some ‘special responsibility’ on the 
charge of dominant undertakings.
130 
 
d. Competition rules – state aid 
The de minimis principle is even more solidly embedded into state aid law, than in Article 101 
TFEU, since it is instituted through a formal Regulation.
131 Further, the Commission practice 
of Notices, Communications as well as block and individual exemptions has prompted several 
authors to talk of a ‘rule of reason’ in the application of Article 107(1).
132 
More importantly, however, the Court has offered states a powerful instrument for 
sidestepping the application of the state aid rules altogether: the Altmark judgment.
133 The net 
effect of the Altmark rules is that money transfers to undertakings entrusted with a mission of 
general interest do not qualify at all  as being aids.
134  This is quite distinct from being 
exempted by virtue of either Articles 107(2) and (3) or Article 106(2) TFEU; the difference 
does not only lie at the conceptual/theoretical level, but also at the practical/procedural one: 
such fund transfers need not be notified to the Commission. 
 
e. General assessment of the mitigating factors 
The techniques used and the doctrines developed in the various areas of the law may 
correspond to different legal necessities and economic realities, but they can all influence the 
economic/non-economic divide. The remoteness doctrine may allow states to keep their less 
mercantilistic regulations away from EU scrutiny. The rule of reason, the contestability theory, 
the doctrine of oligopolistic interdependence, and other notions in the field of competition law 
may offer precious instruments in order to moderate the impact of the relevant rules on 
economic sectors which had previously been considered as non-economic (such as e.g. 
network-bound activities). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
128 The most vocal promoters of the theory of contestable markets being Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J., 
and Willig, R., Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (San Diego: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1982). See also Bork, R.H., The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 
(New York: Free Press, 1993). 
129 See Albors- Llorens, A., ‘The Role of Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the Application 
of Article 82 EC’ (2007) 48 CML Rev  1727-61; Lowenthal, P.J., ‘The Defence of “Objective 
Justification” in the Application of Article 82’ (2005) 28 World Competition 455-77; also Vickers, J., 
‘Abuse of Market Power’ (2005) 115:504 Economic J, F244-F261. 
130  For the existence of special responsibility, see Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden 
Industrie Michelin v. Commission of the European Communities [1983] ECR 3461, para 57; Case 
T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission of the European Communities [1990] ECR II-309, 
para 23; Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v. Commission of the European Communities [1998] 
ECR II-2937, para. 138. 
131 Commission Regulation 69/2001/EC on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to 
de minimis aid [2001] OJ L10/30. 
132 Bartosch, A., ‘Is there a need for a Rule of Reason in European State aid law?: Or how to Arrive 
at a Coherent Concept of Material Selectivity?’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 729-52. 
133 Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747; for this judgment and all its implications, see the 
discussion under subheading B(5)d below. 
134 The four Altmark conditions have been further softened by the General Court in Case T-289/03 
BUPA [2008] ECR II-81.   28 
From a normative point of view, all the above instruments serve the same function: they 
prevent the application of the respective EU rules, thus mitigating their impact on the 
regulatory freedom of states and contractual autonomy of undertakings. They operate ex 
ante, when the respective scope of action of the EU and its member states is defined. In this, 
they are different from exceptions, which operate ex post, once it has been determined that 
the EU rules are, in principle, applicable. Such distinction, however, is not always crystal clear 
in relation to the competition rules.  
 
E. General exceptions 
All four categories of rules examined here are subject to exceptions, express or judge-made. 
This is not the place to develop a general theory of exceptions to the Treaty rules. It is, 
however, useful to briefly examine how such exceptions may be used in order to draw the line 
between economic and non-economic activities.  
 
1. Free Movement 
The express exceptions of Articles 36, 45(3), and 52 TFEU to the free movement rules allow 
derogations to, subject to proportionality review, for measures which are justified on public 
policy, security, and health grounds. Therefore, state measures connected to the core state 
functions, irrespective of whether they qualify as economic or not, are excluded from the 
Treaty rule by virtue of an express exception. Although express exceptions have been overall 
interpreted in a restrictive way by the Court, public health has been considerably expanded in 
the last years.
135  Therefore, even if the provision of social healthcare services has been 
qualified as an economic activity, restrictions thereto have been upheld, ia on public health 
grounds.  
Moreover, among the overriding reasons of public interest (ORPIs), the ‘financial balance’ 
justification offers yet another ground for upholding national measures which are necessary 
for maintaining economically non-viable activities, such as healthcare, social security, and the 
like.
136 
 
2. Public procurement 
For the exceptions, exclusions, and graduations applicable to the procurement regime, 
reference should be made to the developments in the previous section. 
                                                            
135  See, among many, Hatzopoulos, V., ‘Financing national health care in a transnational 
environment: the impact of the EC internal market’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin Int L J 761-804.. 
136 In general, for judge-made exceptions to the free movement of services, including services of a 
non-economic nature, see Fernandez Martin, J.M. and O’Leary, S., ‘Judicial exceptions to the Free 
Provision of Services’ in Andenas, M. and Roth W.H. (eds), Services and Free Movement in EU 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 163-95.   29 
 
3. Competition rules – private conduct 
Article 101(3) TFEU formally introduces exceptions to the application of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
However, to the extent that these are intended to cover conduct already falling under 101(1), 
they are of little help in the distinction between economic and non-economic activities.  
More interesting for the purposes of the present study is the broad ‘rule of reason’ approach 
developed by the Court, encompassing not only considerations of economic welfare, but more 
generally, reasons of general interest. This rule of reason approach does not take place within 
Article 101(3) TFEU, but in the framework of Article 101(1) TFEU and technically results in 
Article 101 TFEU being inapplicable as a whole. Therefore, it should be dealt with in the 
previous section, together with other ‘mitigating factors’. The reason why it is presented here 
is because of the nature of the reasons which are taken into account: they would qualify as 
ORPIs under the free movement law.  
This broad ‘rule of reason’ approach has been launched by the Court in Wouters,
137 
concerning a Dutch rule precluding lawyers from founding integrated firms with accountants. 
The Court, after having found that all the usual conditions for the application of the 
competition rules were present, held that some agreements or decisions of associations of 
undertakings may fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU, in view of their ‘context’:
138 the objective of 
securing the sound administration of justice and of protecting consumers could justify 
restrictions to competition. Further on, in the same judgment, the Court found that exactly the 
same reasons could justify an eventual violation to the free movement rules concerning 
establishment and services. In other words, the Court held that the ORPIs related to 
professional ethics etc. – already recognized as such since the very Van Binsbergen case
139 
– which serve to justify restrictions to the free movement also serve to exclude altogether the 
application of the competition rules.  
This remarkable judgment stood isolated for some time, until it was confirmed and expanded 
by Meca-Medina, a case in which the International Olympic Committee’s rules on doping had 
been qualified as a decision of an association of undertakings. The Court confirmed that in 
the framework of Article 101(1), the context of the collusion needs to be taken into account, 
referring in particular to the objectives of the conduct examined: in this case, it was ‘the need 
to safeguard equal chances for athletes, athletes’ health, the integrity and objectivity of 
competitive sport and ethical values in sport’.
140  The Court further explained that the 
concomitant restrictive effects should be tested as to whether they are ‘inherent’ (ie 
necessary) and proportionate to the objectives pursued.
141  
                                                            
137 C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577. 
138 Ibid, para 97. 
139 Case 33/74 van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299. 
140 C-519/04 P Meca-Medina [2006] ECR I-6991, para 43. 
141 Ibid, para 42.   30 
The above cases stand for the idea that, not only do the ORPIs recognized under free 
movement law also apply as a rule of reason in the framework of Article 101(1), but also that 
they are subject to the well-known conditions of necessity and proportionality. 
 
d. State aid rules 
Article 107(2) deems to be compatible with the common market state aid which either has a 
social character or compensates for natural disasters.
142 Article 107(3) foresees categories of 
aids which may be approved by the Commission, on an individual basis: a, for areas facing 
special difficulties, b. for the promotion of projects of European interest,
143  c. for certain 
economic activities or areas, d. for culture and heritage, and e. other exceptions specified by 
the Council on a proposal from the Commission. Moreover, the Commission, upon delegation 
from the Council,
144  has adopted block exemption Regulations (BERs) concerning aid to 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs),
145 training aid,
146 aid for employment,
147 and 
national regional investment aid.
148 Therefore, states do have the opportunity to fund activities 
which are not viable in strictly commercial terms and to obtain individual exemptions. 
 
F. Services of general economic interest as an exception: Article 106(2) TFEU 
Article 106(2) TFEU is no more than yet another exception to the Treaty rules. By the same 
token, however, it has historically been the first and still is the only Treaty provision 
introducing a material rule in favour of activities which, while being of an economic nature, 
should not be fully subject to market forces. This is why it is being examined separately. 
Despite the fact that Article 106 TFEU is located within the Treaty rules on competition, it has 
been constantly understood by the Court –  in accordance with its wording –  to offer an 
exception to all Treaty rules. 
 
1. Free movement 
The Court has held that Article 106(2) TFEU may justify restrictions to Article 37 TFEU, on the 
prohibition of commercial monopolies in relation to the free movement of goods.
149 Further, 
the Court held that also restrictions to Article 56 TFEU may be justified by virtue of Article 
                                                            
142 There is also a third ground, which, however, is likely to be repealed after 2014: aid justified by 
the unification of Germany. 
143 A possibility mostly used to curb the effects of the 2008 financial crisis; see in more detail, 
Gebski, S., ‘Competition First? Application of State Aid Rules in the Banking Sector’ (2009) 6 
Competition L Rev 89-115.  
144 Council Regulation 994/98/EC on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing 
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to State aid for employment [2002] OJ L 337/3. 
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106(2) TFEU. This was expressly stated for the first time in Corsica Ferries France,
150 and 
expressly confirmed in Deutsche Post.
151 
 
2. Public procurement 
Given that public procurement rules and principles specifically apply to ‘public’ services, not 
provided within normal market conditions, Article 106(2) should, in principle, not allow for 
exceptions thereto. Indeed, the special nature of the activity is already taken into account 
when an entity qualifies as ‘contracting authority’, thus making the procurement rules 
applicable in the first place. It would seem redundant, or even counter-productive, that this 
same element be considered again in order to set aside the procurement rules.  
Ambulanz Glöckner,
152 an isolated case where the Court had implied that non-emergency 
ambulance services could be awarded without tender if they served to finance the costly 
emergency services recently, seems abandoned in Commission v. Germany (old-age 
insurance):
153 the Court confirmed that no activity in itself justifies an exemption from the 
procurement rules and principles. 
 
3. Competition rules – private conduct 
Article 106(2) was clearly intended to justify exceptions to the competition rules and, 
expectedly, this is the area in which it has been applied most.  
In a number of cases, the Court has positively applied Article 106(2) TFEU, holding that an 
exclusive or special right was required for the undertaking in question to perform the universal 
services under economically acceptable conditions.
154 This body of case law was initiated 
with the judgment in Corbeau, where the Court clarified that the ‘effet utile’ of Article 102 
TFEU did not preclude member states from attributing exclusive rights, to the extent 
‘necessary to ensure the performance of the particular tasks assigned to the undertakings 
possessed of the exclusive rights (sic)’.
155 
Corbeau  was considered to be a breakthrough case. Not only did it put a brake to the 
liberalization/deregulation frenzy of its era, but it also legitimized the award of exclusive rights 
further than what was strictly necessary: the holder of the exclusive rights was entitled to 
‘have the benefit of economically acceptable conditions’.
156  It introduced, however, an 
important limitation: ‘the exclusion of competition is not justified as regards specific services 
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153 Case C-271/08 Commission v. Germany (old-age insurance) [2010] nyr. 
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155 Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533, para 14.  
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dissociable from the service of general interest which meet special needs of economic 
operators and which call for certain additional services not offered by the  [holder of the 
exclusive rights]’.
157 This ‘severability’ test was expressed in quite restrictive terms in this 
case, though its actual application was left to the national court.  
The  Corbeau  conditions have been further eased, to the benefit of member states, in 
Glöckner, in two ways. First, in this case, concerning emergency and non-emergency 
ambulance services, the Court itself applied the severability test less restrictively: it was easily 
satisfied that the two kinds of services were not severable and that both could be reserved to 
the benefit of same undertaking.
158 Secondly, the Court, for the first time, admitted that the 
SGI justifying the award of special/exclusive rights is not just any (rudimentary or minimal) 
service, but may be characterized by ‘quality and reliability’.
159  
 
d. Competition law – State aid 
Since the state aid rules do provide for both activity- and area-specific exceptions (Articles 
107(2) and (3) TFEU), for which the Commission may issue block exemption regulations and 
since the Council may create further exceptions to 107(1) TFEU, the utility of Article 106(2) 
TFEU is not altogether clear in the area of state aids. This notwithstanding, the Court in 
FFSA, concerning ia a tax brake in favour of the French La Poste, held Article 106(2) TFEU to 
offer a valid ground for exception to the application of Article 107 TFEU.
160  This was 
confirmed by subsequent judgments
161  and has been officially acknowledged by the 
Commission in its Community Framework for State Aid.
162 According to this last document, 
state aid under Article 106(2) TFEU need be notified and may be declared compatible by the 
Commission.  
The need for notification is one important point which differentiates Article 106(2) TFEU from 
the Altmark case law. In counterpart, it has been put forward that the Article 106(2) TFEU 
exception is more lenient than Altmark in that it does not need to meet the fourth Altmark 
condition,  i.e.  the efficient cost criterion.
163  It should be noted that given the generous 
interpretation of Altmark  by the General Court in BUPA,  the above distinction may be of 
limited importance. In any case, both these grounds for disapplying the state aid rules are 
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160 Case T-106/95 FFSA [1997] ECR II-229, para 178.  
161  Case T-46/97  Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) SA v. Commission of the 
European Communities [2000] ECR II-2125; Case C-332/98 French Republic v. Commission of 
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International, Federal express international (France) SNC and CRIE SA [2003] ECR I-4777. 
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163  See Fiedziuk, N., ‘Towards a More Refined Economic Approach to Services of General 
Economic Interest’ (2010) 16 Eur P L  271-88, at 277. It is reminded that the four Altmark 
conditions are: a) entrustment of a service of general interest to a given undertaking, b) upfront 
transparent calculation of cost, c) no overcompensation and d) no compensation for inefficiencies.   33 
further distinguished from the Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU exceptions, to the extent that the 
more refined economic approach introduced by the 2005 State Aid Action Plan only apply to 
the latter.
164 
 
e. General assessment of Article 106(2)
165 
It has been demonstrated that Article 106(2) has come to be applied in all four sectors under 
study. For one, it has been shown that its application in the field of public procurement is 
superfluous, if not counter-productive, and should remain marginal. Further, to the extent that 
the ‘financial equilibrium’ ORPI is developed within free movement law, it is unclear what role 
is left, if any, for Article 106(2) TFEU. Thirdly, in the field of state aid, where non-economic 
considerations may be taken into account already in the context of the Treaty-based 
exceptions (Articles 107(2) and (3) TFEU), and where the Altmark exclusion operates broadly 
along the same lines as Article 106(2) TFEU exception, the functions left for Article 106(2) 
TFEU remain elusive. Even in the area primarily contemplated by Article 106(2) TFEU, that of 
competition law, its usefulness could be questioned, especially in view of the existence of 
other mitigating factors and the recognition of a broader rule of reason, in Wouters and Meca-
Medina.
166  
It is true that nowadays, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with Article 16, 
Protocol No. 26 and the Charter having binding force (henceforth: the triple 
constitutionalisation of SGIs), Article 106(2) may be source of more problems than it resolves. 
Until such time, however, as the above new provisions are interpreted by the Court and 
applied by the Commission, Article 106(2) offers welcome, no matter how imperfect, legal 
predictability. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Three points emerge from the above.  
First, from an institutional point of view, the analysis has shown that a clear antagonistic 
relationship may be identified between the Commission on the one hand, and the member 
states on the other. Indeed, it has been observed that, starting with the 1996 Communication 
on SGIs, the Commission has steadily moved the borders between the economic and the 
non-economic sphere in favour of the former. It was also noted that liberalization of the 
network based industries and the effort, coordinated at the EU level, to secure ‘universal 
service’ have awakened consciousness of the importance of SGIs and of the need to adopt a 
coherent regulatory approach toward them. This explains an apparent contradiction: the more 
the process of liberalization advances and the Commission pushes, through soft law, to the 
direction of increasing the scope of application of the Treaty rules, the more the member 
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states tend to recognize an EU competence in this field to act also through hard law. In other 
words, Commission’s activity in this field increases awareness of the problems raised and 
offers conceptual tools (mainly the distinction between SGI and NESGI) which allow for the 
adoption of more binding texts and b) puts the pressure on member states to ‘repatriate’ from 
the Commission to the Council (and the European Parliament) competences which 
traditionally belong to member states. In this game the Court has acted in a way of a referee 
and, although verbally promoting an expansive vision of the EU (and its own) competences, 
materially, it has regularly upheld member states’ choices in respect of the organization of 
SGI. It is interesting to note, however, that the Court’s activity is perceived in an uneven 
manner by public opinion and the media: while judgments like Viking and Laval attract great 
attention (essentially as being over-intrusive), pronouncements of equal importance which 
recognize member states’ leeway to organize their social sphere, such as Glöckner, Altmark 
or BUPA, only receive limited coverage. Against the above background, the effects of the 
triple constitutionalization of SGIs in the Lisbon Treaty, in particular of the clear reserve in 
favour of member states in relation to NESGIs (Protocol No. 26) and the express competence 
of the EU in relation to SGEIs (Article 14(2) TFEU) still need to materialize. 
Secondly, for all the heated theoretical debates concerning the economic/non-economic 
divide, it has been shown above that, the Court only rarely goes down this slippery slope. 
Faced with situations and/or services where the applicability of EU rules is uncertain, the 
Court rather refers itself to a series of six criteria out of which the nature of the activity is only 
one; all the others are more technical and, thus, more susceptible of judicial appreciation. 
This is not to say that the Court always applies these more technical criteria in a coherent 
manner; these criteria, however, allow the Court to resolve everyday disputes without being 
constantly exposed to the intricacies and uncertainties of the political debate. In doing so, the 
Court itself has developed judicial tools which allow it to set aside EU law whenever the 
activity and/or the objective served so requires: solidarity as a means of setting aside or 
creating inroads to internal market and competition rules, Corbeau  etc as a means of 
justifying special and exclusive rights, Altmark etc as a means of allowing for state subsidies 
are just few instruments whereby the Court accommodates non-economic activities within EU 
law. 
Thirdly, the above analysis highlights that EU-minded people or Institutions need not militate 
in favour of an expansive vision of ‘economic’. If it is true that genuinely non-economic 
activities carried out by the state fall outside the scope of EU law, it is also undisputable that, 
as soon as these same (non-economic) activities are to be awarded to some non-state actor, 
EU rules/principles on public procurement become applicable. Therefore, stressing the 
concept of ‘economic’ is neither necessary nor conducive for promoting EU orthodoxy. 
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